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CHANGING AGRICULTURE'S TRADITIONS FOR
THE BETTER
RUDY BOSCHWITZ*
There's a story on Capitol Hill about a young Congress-
man, flush from his election victory, who earned a seat on the
Agriculture Committee. After a couple of months, he was in
a muddle. The subject was complicated, the different com-
modity groups fought incessantly among themselves, and it
was all cloaked in an arcane language that he did not
understand.
"I'm not sure what to do," he confided to a committee
veteran.
The aging solon replied with his own agricultural policy,
"Just vote no and say it's not enough."
While a complicated series of economic, political and
even meteorological events has led to the current farm crisis,
many of its roots are in a Congress too willing to say "it's not
enough."
In other ways, a lack of Congressional innovation and
critical thinking about farm programs has led to the current
difficulties facing agriculture. Since the 1930s, the federal
government has sponsored a farm program. In fact, despite
enormous changes in the way American farmers produce and
market their products, the Farm Bill of 1985' is basically the
same as the program approved by Congress in 1933. Only
the numbers have changed. With the 1985 Farm Bill, Con-
gress has taken only the first, mincing steps toward a new di-
rection for agriculture.
If we are to restore and maintain prosperity for rural
America, we need to break away from these tradition-bound
programs. They've made farmers too dependent on govern-
ment and too convinced that the U.S. government can ma-
nipulate markets to their liking.
But the cycle cannot be broken quickly. The pain of ab-
rupt change would be felt sharply throughout rural America
and our banking system. What I propose is a gradual weaning
* United States Senator (R-MN).
1. Food Security Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-198, 99 Stat. 1354
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 7, 12, 15, 16, 21, 29, 42
and 46 U.S.C.) (Supp. 111 1985).
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of farmers from the government, giving them a steadily in-
creasing taste of the marketplace. It will not be cheap, espe-
cially in the first couple of years. But the alternatives are few
(they're not cheap either), especially when you consider the
substantial economic and political influence of American
farmers.
When I first came to the Senate, I was as confused as the
young Congressman in the story. Agricultural programs are
enormously complicated and intertwined in such a way that
efforts to help one group often have serious consequences for
another. In discussing the approach I think the government
should take toward agriculture, I'd like first to explain the
background that led me to these conclusions. It is only when
you understand who farmers are, politically and economi-
-cally, how the current programs work (or don't work), what
has happened in the world economy over the last 15 years to
cause such distress in the rural economy, and what our alter-
natives are, that you see the need for a shift away from gov-
ernment involvement in American agriculture. I don't rec-
ommend erasing government from the picture in the short-
run, although I certainly suggest reducing its role.
I. WHO ARE THE FARMERS?
The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)
reports that there are almost 2.3 million farms in the United
States.' However, that number includes, practically every doc-
tor and lawyer, with a few acres and a horse, who calls him-
self a farmer. In truth, about 70 percent of those farms have
gross sales (not income, but sales) of less than $40,000 a
year.8 More than half of these farms sell less than $5,000
worth of goods a year.' These farmers work part-time or get
all of their income from off-farm sources." They are hobby
farmers-people who enjoy living in the country but do not
depend on agriculture for their livelihood.
More than half of the remaining 30 percent of farmers
have sales between $40,000 and $100,000 a year.' These are
small operations. They may be full-or part-time farms (often
2. ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVicE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,
ECONOMIC INDICATORS OF THE FARM SECTOR, NATIONAL FINANCIAL SUMMARY,
1985, 42 (1986) [hereinafter ECONOMIC INDICATORS OF THE FARM SwcToR]
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 48.
6. ECONOMIC INDICATORS OF THE FARM SECTOR. supra note 2.
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one of the spouses has an in-town job) and many of them are
facing economic difficulties. Of the remaining farms, one per-
cent sell more than $500,000 of goods a year.7 Most of these
are successful family-owned operations. They will survive, al-
most no matter what Congress does, because they are ex-
tremely efficient and well-managed.
The remaining farms-about 12 percent of all
farms-have sales between $100,000 and $500,000 a year.8
These are full-time, commercial farms, and they are most af-
fected by government policy. Many of them have very high
debt loads, incurred as they tried to move into the "large"
farm group, or incurred as an accident of birth-that is, they
started farming and bought farm land in the 1970s when
prices skyrocketed.
As a group, farmers are well represented in Washington,
D.C. More than 180 organizations are registered with the
U.S. Senate to lobby for agricultural interests. My own state
of Minnesota has more than 40 statewide agricultural groups,
from the Wild Rice Research and Promotion Board to the
Minnesota Honey Producers. Unfortunately, what helps one
group often hurts another, and so the lobbyists frequently
work at cross purposes. This makes consistent agricultural
policy all the more difficult to develop.
II. How DO FEDERAL PROGRAMS WORK?
How much of the average American dinner is subsidized
by federal farm programs? Not much. If you had a dinner of
steak, vegetable, salad, bread and milk, only the bread and
milk are affected by federal programs. I should note that
those farms raising commodities not involved in government
programs-pork, beef, chicken, vegetables, fruit-are doing
pretty well this year.
The primary crops tied to federal programs are dairy,
corn (and other feed grains), wheat, cotton and rice. It is the
corn and wheat producers (sometimes producers of soybeans,
who have what amounts to half a federal program-but we
won't go into that) that you see on television at farm protest
rallies. They are the ones who depend most on the govern-
ment programs and have the biggest gripe about it.
As they are currently arranged, the federal farm pro-
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ample because it is the largest crop, but the programs func-
tion similarly in all the other crops.
If you enroll in the federal program, the federal govern-
ment promises you a set price for each bushel of corn you
produce-$3.03 a bushel. These so-called target prices are
simply numbers pulled out of the air by Congress. They re-
present what Congress thinks the appropriate price of com-
modities would be, but they bear no relation to the real
world. Frankly, $3.03 is well-above the current market price
and nearly $2 over the variable cost of production for many
corn farmers, so it provides an enormous incentive to put on
more fertilizer, use better seeds and chemicals and otherwise
just produce like crazy. Farmers who take great pride in their
productive capacity have done just that.
In order to qualify for that target price, a farmer must
agree to leave idle a certain portion of his land. Called "acre-
age reduction programs" or "set-asides," these restrictions
are intended somehow to control the production that the
high target price induces. They haven't worked. Between
1985 and 1986, the corn set-aside requirement was doubled
from 10 percent of a farmer's acreage to 20 percent." In
1985, U.S. farmers produced 8.9 billion bushels of corn. In
1986, despite twice the set-aside, production still amounted
to 8.3 billion bushels, a decline of less than 7 percent.1"
It's like driving a car with one foot on the accelerator
and one on the brake. You can do it for awhile, but eventu-
ally the brake linings wear thin and then you've got troublel
Farmers receive their benefits in two parts-the loan and
the deficiency payment. Each fall when they harvest their
crops, they face a decision. They can sell it on the market, or
they can put it under loan to the government. Right now,
government loan rates-the amount the government will
oan a farmer while he waits to market his crop under
loan-are above the world market price, prompting many
farmers to put their crop under loan. Normally, the loan has
to be paid back, with interest, within nine months. But farm-
ers who cannot sell their crops at a price above the loan rate
9. The 1985 Farm Bill gave the Secretary of Agriculture the au-
thority to order an acreage limitation of up to twenty percent for the 1986
crop of corn and other feed grains, based upon an estimate by the Secre-
tary that the quantity of corn on hand in the U.S. at the beginning of the
marketing year (September 1986) would be more than two billion bushels.
7 U.S.C.A. § 1444e(f)(B) (Supp. 1987).
10. ECONOMIc RSEAsRcH SERVICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICuLTURE,
128 AGRICULTURAL OuTLooK 45 (March 1987).
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can choose to forfeit the crop to the federal government and
keep the money from the loan. Thus, the government can
become the owner of huge supplies of surplus grain.
Because U.S. farmers can, in effect, sell their crop to the
government at a relatively high level, loan rates have acted as
a price floor in this country and an umbrella over world com-
modity prices. As loan rates grew-from $1.10 a bushel in
1975 to $2.55 in 1985-they provided a strong incentive to
grain producers in other countries to plant as much as they
could. This has cost us dearly in world export markets, so the
loan rate needed to be lowered. This was one important ac-
complishment of the 1985 Farm Bill.
Any difference between the loan rate (or the market
price if it is higher than the loan rate) and the target price is
paid directly to the farmer as a "deficiency payment." Defi-
ciency payments are designed to support farm income at the
target price level while allowing the market price to fall when
commodities are in surplus. In theory, deficiency payments
are more market oriented than would be the case if the gov-
ernment manipulated things to keep the market price high.
In practice, the high target prices have encouraged so much
production that we are faced with perpetual surpluses, per-
petual deficiency payments, and perpetual government
expenditures.
III. THE BOOM AND THE BUST
While the system we have used for agriculture for 50
years is the source of the farmer's dependency on the federal
government, agriculture's current problems took root in the
1970s. Those were fantastic years for American farmers. We
went from exporting less than $7 billion worth of agricultural
commodities in 1970 to $43.8 billion by 1981.1 These re-
sults were due to good luck and several external factors:
1) The Soviets made a political decision to import grain
in times of shortage, rather than following their
traditional approach of slaughtering livestock.
2) Bad weather conditions prevailed in some parts of
the world, but not in the United States.
3) World economic growth was relatively strong.
4) Real interest rates remained fairly low, which en-
11. C. HANRAHAN, WHY U.S. AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS HAVE DECLINED
IN THE 1980s 3 (Congressional Research Service 84-223 ENR, 1984).
19871
JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY
couraged borrowing and buying by developing
countries.
5) Finally, the value of the U.S. dollar was low relative
to other major currencies.
In those days, the market itself-not government pol-
icy-brought prosperity to farmers and to those involved
with the infrastructure of agriculture-small town
merchants, truckers, food processors, and feed and seed
manufacturers.
It would be hard to imagine a more complete turn-
around of these external factors than occurred in the 1980s.
1) The Soviet grain embargo of 1980 shattered confi-
dence in the reliability of the U.S. as a food supplier.
2) The world as a whole had several years of good
weather.
3) The global recession crimped our traditional custom-
ers' ability to purchase.
4) Interest rates went up dramatically and are still high
in real terms.
5) The value of the dollar increased enormously.
6) On top of it all, some countries used export subsidies
to increase their shares of a world market that has
been relatively stagnant.
U.S. agricultural policy was simply not flexible enough to
adjust, and indeed the 1981 Farm Bill made it worse by pric-
ing our products at even more noncompetitive levels. As I
watched the value and tonnage of our exports fall, more or
less, year after year in the 80s (in a troubling correlation with
falling land values), I started also to see the effects of this
decline spread across the face of rural Minnesota.
In 1984, the rural economy was solidly locked in reces-
sion. I ran for re-election that year and had quite a sense of
it. 1985 got worse. It became clear to me that the high loan
rates of the 1981 Farm Bill were exacerbating the decline of
our agricultural economy.
IV. WHAT ARE THE ALTERNATIVES?
When we started debates on the 1985 Farm Bill more
than two years ago, most Senators had three main goals. Ev-
eryone wanted to maintain farm income at a reasonable level.
Most wanted to make U.S. commodities more price-competi-
tive so we could regain the lost volume on international mar-
kets and relieve the enormous surpluses of grain piling up
here. And the whole process was governed by the need to
[Vol. 3
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meet often-changing budget constraints.
While the 1985 bill will cost much more than almost any-
one had imagined-price and income support measures cost
$26 billion in 1987 alone-the scorecard for the other goals
looks a lot better. Indeed, staying the course with the 1985
bill, which was an effort to eliminate the worst aspects of the
traditional federal programs without dismantling them, is the
primary alternative for farm policy for the rest of the 1980s.
Despite the changes I would like to see in farm policy,
the 1985 bill isn't all bad. Farm income is pretty well main-
tained. Pumping $26 billion into this segment of the econ-
omy is bound to do some good, and it has. Those farmers
who have used some new marketing tools that were put into
the bill to allow them to roll over crops they have been stor-
ing have made a tidy profit this year, albeit much of it from
the government.
Secondly, the 1985 bill has done a decent job of making
our commodities price-competitive on the world market. In
rice and cotton we have seen amazing booms in demand be-
cause of a change in policy that allows the government to
make up the difference between the world price and our rela-
tively high loan rates. Corn and wheat sales have remained
sluggish, but our low prices (achieved by lowering the loan
rate for corn from $2.55 to $1.84 per bushel) are helping to
bring our foreign competitors to the negotiating table. Be-
cause the U.S. was willing to change the rules in the world
marketplace, agriculture has become a primary topic in the
new round of talks under the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade. There is certainly more interest in reforming
world agriculture trade practices among major exporting
countries than was the case a couple years ago.
While the 1985 bill did point us in the right direction,
calls for a more basic change in policy continue. In this arti-
cle, I would like to explore my own proposal and one from
Senator Tom Harkin of Iowa which has gotten a lot of atten-
tion in the popular press and among certain farm groups.
V. THE TROUBLE WITH MANDATORY PRODUCTION CONTROLS
Senator Harkin believes that the federal government can
manage the supply of agricultural products and thereby guar-
antee higher market prices to farmers. One of the attractive
features of this program, at least to farmers, is that a referen-
dum would be held on the plan before it would be put into
place. If a majority of those allowed to vote in the referen-
19871
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dum approved, a system of mandatory supply controls would
be established. Every farmer in the country would be bound
by those supply controls, which has led one columnist to say
that the plan would need "wheat police."'
Under Senator Harkin's plan,'18 the loan rate would rise
to $3.50 a bushel in corn and similarly high levels in other
crops. To manage the huge increase in production that
would be prompted by such an increase in price levels, a sys-
tem of acreage reductions and marketing quotas would be es-
tablished. Both domestic and export demand would be esti-
mated by USDA, then an acreage reduction would be
calculated in an effort to match output with expected de-
mand. Each farmer would be issued marketing certificates
which would have to be presented to the buyer before the
farmer could market any part of his crop. The certificates
would be the major control mechanism in the bill. Additional
supplies could be fed to animals, but even livestock farmers
would have to abide by the acreage reduction requirements.
The cost of the program would be borne through higher
food prices. Consumers would not be allowed to vote in the
referendum.
I'm no fan of production control schemes under any cir-
cumstances, and certainly not ones which would attempt to
distort economic realities as much as these. Because the refer-
endum makes the proposal somehow seem democratic, it ap-
peals to the populist sense of rural America. Furthermore,
many farmers seem to assume they can figure a way around
the program in the same way they figured ways around the
current system. To do so would be fraudulent, however, and
would make criminals out of farmers who simply want to
plant what they wish.
The effects of the Harkin plan extend far beyond the
farm gate. Indeed every American would pay for this policy
in the grocery store.
A mandatory supply control program amounts to an ex-
tremely unfair food tax. A recent study by the National
12. In a column in the Washington Post, Michael Kinsley criticized
the "Save the Family Farm Act," introduced in 1986 by Senator Harkin
and Rep. Richard Gephardt (D-MO.), as "[a] system of inherited privilege
based on land, financed by a large indirect tax on food, enforced by cadres
of wheat police." Kinsley, The Democrats' Worst New Idea, Wash. Post, Nov.
6, 1986, at A19, col. 1. The "Save the Family Farm Act" is essentially the
same as S.658, introduced in 1987, infra note 13.




Center for Food and Agricultural Policy found food prices
would rise by 14 percent by 1995 under the Harkin bill, ad-
ding $65 billion to the nation's food bills."" Because those
with lower incomes pay a greater percentage of their income
for basic needs, like food, they would bear an unfair share of
the cost of this program. If we are to support farm in-
come-and I think in the short run we must-we should do
it through general tax revenues which are paid in large part
by those who can afford it.
Senator Harkin's plan also would be devastating for all of
those whose livelihoods depend on farmers. Most of those in
agricultural businesses-and that includes everyone from the
small town hardware store owner to multinational grain com-
anies-depend on volume as well as price. Agriculture,
roadly defined, creates about 18 percent of our Gross Na-
tional Product." Two of those percents are added on the
farm. That's all. Another 2 percent comes from supplies sold
to the farmer, such as seed, feed and fertilizer. The remain-
ing 11 percent is added after the crop leaves the farm. In an
effort to assist the 2 percent on the farm, we would cause
untold harm to the remaining 13 percent. A recent study by
the Economic Research Service of USDA concludes that
acreage reduction under a mandatory supply control pro-
gram could reduce overall GNP by $64 billion annually. 6
That's an awful lot of "hidden cost" to impose on an already
beleaguered agricultural economy.
In addition, mandatory supply control raises production
costs per unit for U.S. farmers and makes our producers arti-
ficially noncompetitive with farmers in other countries. Fixed
costs just don't go away when land is idled. Instead, they
must b spread over fewer bushels, bales, or pounds of pro-
duction. This, in turn, raises the price level that our farmers
need just to break even. In effect, if the government wants to
keep farmers whole after imposing an acreage reduction on
them, it has to turn around and pay them larger deficiency
payments to make up the difference.
Acreage reduction also sends signals to our competitors.
By raising the price of homegrown products we encourage
14. NATIONAL CENTER FOR FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL POLICY, THE 1985
FARM BILL REVISITED: MID COURSE CORRECTIONS OR STAY THE COURSE (Brief-
ing Book) (February 1987).
15. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, AGRICULTURE'S LINKS TO THE
NATIONAL ECONOMY 3 (Income and Employment Agriculture Information
Bulletin No. 504, October 1986).
16. Id. at 5-6.
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imports. I don't want to have Canada bake our bread and
make our cereals, which could well happen under this plan.
We'd have to erect enormous tariff barriers to keep foreign
products out of the United States.
Lastly, the Harkin plan carries a moral cost. It seems
wasteful, in a world that is still overwhelmingly hungry, to
shut off our production and manipulate the free market to
raise the income of a small percentage of the population. We
have enormous resources in this country, both natural advan-
tages like the fertile plains, and man-made advantages such as
our coast-to-coast rail system and grain elevators in seemingly
every little town around the country. To purposefully idle
them seems wrong.
VI. DECOUPLING
As an alternative to the current program and to a
mandatory supply system, I have proposed that we simply
break the link between government payments and the re-
quirement that farmers produce a certain crop. I call this
decoupling. In essence, we need to allow farmers to plant
what makes sense economically, rather than keeping them
locked into planting for the government program. Current
law does a great job of inducing farmers to plant the full
amount allowable regardless of the market price, in order to
get income support.
Instead, I propose that income support be paid according
to some historic measure of production. Take, for example, a
farmer with 200 acres in corn and a certified yield of 110
bushels per acre. Although we haven't decided on a level of
payment, let's assume the transition payment is $1.00 per
bushel. Thus, our farmer would receive an annual payment
of $22,000 (200 acres x 100 bushels x $1.00 = $22,000).
Most likely, part of the transition payment would be paid in
the spring and the other part paid in the fall to help with
financial planning.
Over time, payments would be reduced, probably by ten
percent for each of the first six years. (Thus, after six years,
payments would be half the original amount.) After six years,
payments could be made at the discretion of the Secretary of
Agriculture.
It is important that a farmer receive a known payment
regardless of what he plants in the current year. It is also im-
portant that the payment not be reduced if the market price
should rise. The fear that a payment would be taken away if
(Vol. 3
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the price goes up would be a strong incentive for many farm
ers to continue producing their program crop.
This approach to income support payments would make
it straightforward and logical to phase out direct payments to
farmers over some period of time. If a farmer knew that he
would receive a definite series of declining payments over 5
or 10 years, he would be able to plan his farm operations ac-
cordingly. Although I believe that the government has an ob-
ligation to help farmers through several difficult transitional
years, I don't believe that we should be in the business of
making perpetual income transfers to the farm sector. (And,
I do not think farmers want that either.) This approach
wouid serve both farmers' and the government's interests
during the transition by making the payments completely
predictable. It would serve taxpayers' interests by allowing ef-
ficient food production and the best use of our agricultural
resources.
The overall effect of decoupling farm income support
from production in this way would be to eliminate the pro-
duction incentive that currently comes from the target price
and the deficiency payments.
An interesting conclusion from the decoupling concept,
given the current low market prices, is that farmers might
choose to leave a lot of land idle if they were free to do so. In
other words, economics could balance supply and demand
where government intervention cannot. This becomes clear
when we realize that corn prices in much of rural Minnesota
are between $1.00 and $1.20 per bushel. Yet, the variable
costs of production are roughly $135 per acre. If a farmer
gets a yield of 100 bushels per acre at a buck a bushel it's
worth $100, so he'll have lost $35 per acre.
Our present program makes the farmer sustain that $35
loss in order to be eligible for a deficiency payment of over
$100 per acre. This farmer would have a $35 increase in in-
come per acre if he planted nothing and was still able to re-
ceive his deficiency payment. On top of that, the government
may well save money because there would be less surplus to
go under loan, to be stored-all costs the government picks
up.
Fewer acres might be planted under my plan, but that
would be because of economic forces taking land out of pro-
duction, not an arbitrary government program. My plan
would allow farmers to make a significant supply adjustment
by their own choice and then bring land back into production
19871
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when conditions improve. Such a program would allow for
much more efficient resource use than is now happening.
While a good deal of lip-service is paid to the "indepen-
dence" of farmers, government programs have actually made
them terrifically dependent. We need to start over with a
program that will allow independent decision-making.
A final point about decoupling. Such a program would
make our domestic programs much more compatible with
free trade in agriculture. Making these changes would com-
plement our efforts in international trade talks. Not only
would our programs be in the best interest of the U.S. do-
mestically, but we would have fashioned a system of income
subsidies which have no effect on production and, thus, cause
no trade distortions. Moving our domestic policies in this di-
rection could well increase our leverage in trade negotiations.
I recognize that payments to farmers under my plan
would be substantial. Frankly, these are necessary to protect
farm income and to ensure that farmers will participate. The
payments would give them a cushion to fall back on while
they adjust to the ups and downs of the marketplace.
Additionally, by making these payments to the agricul-
ture sector, we may save ourselves billions of dollars other-
wise spent bailing out banks which have made big invest-
ments in agriculture and will lose them if farmers begin to go
under in large numbers.
CONCLUSION
The problems of farmers really do extend far beyond the
local elevator and the farmstead. Unfortunately, Congress
and the public often have failed to see these far-reaching ef-
fects. To achieve an effective farm policy, I believe we must
first move farmers back toward economic realities. You can't
fool them for long. If we make farmers permanently depen-
dent on the government, we will end up hurting our entire
rural economy.
By moving farmers toward the market, albeit slowly and
at some cost, we will lay the foundation for a brighter future
for agriculture-one in which farmers, not the government,
make the decisions.
[Vol. 3
